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Abstract:  
Over the last twenty years the level and volatility of inflation decreased across industrial 
countries. The inflation stabilization can be explained by a shift in monetary policy or by 
a lucky period of low volatility in business cycle shocks. To test the “luck hypothesis” we 
examine the inflation experience of Canada, one of the earliest and most successful 
adopters of an inflation targeting monetary policy. We Kalman-filter the historical 
structural shocks consistent with an estimated DSGE model. The estimated shocks are 
used to build counterfactual histories. Ex-ante the model predicts inflation volatility to 
more than halve under inflation targeting. But conditional on the shocks, we show that 
the luck hypothesis can explain with a high probability Canada’s low inflation volatility 
since the early 1990s. Any inflation stabilization induced by the shift in policy is 
accounted for the most part by the impact on expectations. Counterfactuals built 
neglecting expectations would prove the inflation targeting policy irrelevant. 
 
Keywords: Business cycle shocks, Kalman filter, Credibility, Inflation targeting 
 
JEL Classification: E42, E52, E58 
 
1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years industrial countries have experienced a marked decline in the level and
volatility of inflation, interest rates, and long term inflation expectations. The recent period of low and
stable inflation can be attributed either to a change in the propagation mechanism of the economy -
the most prominent explanation being a shift in the management of monetary policy - or to a reduction
in the volatility of exogenous shocks.
What are the reasons behind the observed change in inflation behaviour across industrial coun-
tries? This paper examines the inflation performance of Canada, an early and successful adopter of
an inflation targeting monetary policy since February 1991, and asks whether it can be explained by
the ’luck hypothesis’. Accepting the luck hypothesis means that conditional on the exogenous shocks
that hit the Canadian economy since 1991 the inflation time series would not have been significantly
diﬀerent under an alternative monetary policy. We focus on the impact of inflation targeting in reduc-
ing inflation volatility, which dropped in Canada from 2.28 over the 1981-1990 decade to 0.51 over the
following 1991-2000 decade, and to 0.48 over the 1991-2005 period (year-over-year core CPI inflation
measured at monthly frequency, reported in Longworth, 2002, Murray, 2006). Our estimates show that
the luck hypothesis cannot be rejected. At the same time, nearly all of the impact of inflation targeting
on the behaviour of inflation was caused by the change in the private sector’s beliefs for monetary
policy. The results are based on a methodology that builds upon, and expands on, a vast literature on
constructing historical counterfactuals using restrictions from DGSE models.
The experience of inflation targeting countries is especially suitable to assess whether good luck
or good policy can account for the observed change in inflation behaviour across industrial countries,
since the monetary authority explicitly announced - and committed to - the inflation targeting policy.
Countries adopting inflation targeting have experienced lower and more stable inflation, and a decline
in the volatility of a wide range of other macroeconomic indicators. On the contrary, in the US case
the existence of a shift in monetary policy regime over the last 25 years is still widely debated. 1
Canada adopted inflation targets in 1991, aimed at stabilizing inflation around a long-term level
of 2%. The change in policy happened at a time when inflation was feared to escalate again after the
1While Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Clarida et al. (2000) provide evidence that US
monetary policy did change in the 1980s, and aﬀected the observed behaviour of inflation, the results in a number of
papers do not support the claim of a shift in the systematic behaviour of US monetary policy, or the claim that it was
responsible for the observed decline in real activity volatility (Ahmed, Levin and Wilson, 2004, Bernanke and Mihov, 1998,
Canova and Gambetti, 2006, Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006, Primiceri, 2005, Sims and Zha, 2006, Stock and Watson,
2003).
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significant reduction achieved in the 1982-84 period, following the economic boom at the end of the
1980s, an oil-price shock, and the introduction of a value added tax. A number of studies (Longworth,
2002, Ravenna, 2009) have documented that since 1991 there have been profound changes in the
behaviour of inflation - beside its lower average level - including changes in its volatility, persistence,
predictability, and in the slope of the Phillips curve. The average value of one measure of inflation
uncertainty fell from 2.43 in 1981-1990 to 1.15 in 1991-2000, and the range of the forecast for long
term inflation, a measure of dispersion in inflation expectations, fell from 6.55 to 2.91 across the
two subsamples (Longoworth, 2002). An important objective of the inflation targeting policy is to
reinforce the stability of the inflation process. The Bank of Canada itself documents that "the short
run response of inflation to measures of excess demand and supply appears to have fallen" (Dodge,
2002). 2 Finding cross country evidence that inflation targeting improves macroeconomic performance
has been challenging (Ball and Sheridan, 2005, Cecchetti and Debelle, 2006, Goncalves and Carvalho,
2009, Levin, Natalucci and Piger, 2004), raising the possibility that the observed inflation stability
was the result of good luck shared across industrial countries. Yet cross country evidence on the
impact of inflation targeting may be hard to come by because aversion to inflation variability increased
across most industrial countries since the 1980s (for cross country comparisons, see Bernanke, Laubach,
Mishkin and Posen, 1999, Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 2002, Mishkin, 1999, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2002, Neumann and von Hagen, 2002, and Truman, 2003).
We investigate the impact of the shift in monetary policy by building counterfactual histories
of the Canadian economy since the adoption of inflation targeting conditional on the earlier monetary
policy and on a vector of shocks Kalman-filtered from data on ten aggregate variables. The shocks
vector and the counterfactual history are constrained to be consistent with a maximum likelihood-
estimated staggered wage and price adjustment DSGE model of the economy.
Contrary to counterfactuals built from VAR reduced-form models, as in Ahmed, Levin and
Wilson (2004), Canova and Gambetti (2009), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), our approach
allows for the policy change to aﬀect the private sector’s expectations. Since a stated goal of inflation
targeting central banks has been to change inflation expectations, the VAR reduced-form approach is
likely to provide a distorted picture (see Benati and Surico, 2009). Our methodology is closer to the
approach used by King and Rebelo (1998), Justiniano and Primiceri (2006), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998), and similar to the ’business cycle accounting’ in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007).
2Admittedly, core inflation standard deviation had been quite low in the second half of the 1980s, but it was even
lower in the second half of the 1990s, with the point estimates for the two subperiods equal to 0.58 and 0.33.
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As in the accounting approach, we take as a starting point a DSGE model, but we also allow for
the possibility that the model may be too stylized to describe the data dynamics. Thus we introduce
an additional vector of disturbances that identifies sources of fluctuations beyond the ones summarized
in the DSGE model, and estimate the DSGE structural shocks with a Kalman filter. This same
methodology is used by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2008), and is related to Ireland (2004) and
Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and to the technique to estimate DSGE models in Sargent (1989). We
provide a comparison of the results under three alternative methodologies. Our estimation shows that
forcing the DSGE model to explain all the volatility in the data would overturn the result from the
counterfactual exercise. Neglecting the policy impact on expectations would also bias the result from
the counterfactual exercise.
We innovate relative to the Kalman filtering literature by showing two alternative ways to build
counterfactuals so as to evaluate how much of the economy dynamics in the inflation targeting period
is accounted for by the change in the path of the policy instrument (a shift in the actual policy) and
by the announcement of an inflation target that is credible and aﬀects expectations (a shift in the
perceived policy)
Finally, we provide an explicit metric to evaluate the likelihood of the luck hypothesis. To test
the luck hypothesis we ask what was the probability of observing the counterfactual inflation history
conditional on the inflation targeting policy. In this way we can evaluate whether the counterfactual
path would have been a more or less likely draw given the estimated variance of the shocks.
The main conclusions we reach are as follows.
With a high probability good luck can explain the low inflation volatility throughout the infla-
tion targeting period in Canada. This result obtains despite model estimates implying the unconditional
expected volatility of inflation to more than halve in the inflation targeting regime. We do not interpret
the evidence for the luck hypothesis as implying that monetary policymaking is irrelevant. Inflation
targeting simply may have not been put to test by inflationary shocks. But our result does support the
good luck over good policy explanation, and - contrary to a vast literature on the impact of inflation
targeting - implies that the shift in monetary policy cannot account for the historical improvement in
inflation performance. While policies may be judged more or less desirable based on their uncondi-
tional properties, the historical evaluation of their performance is only meaningful if conditioned on
the business cycle shocks.
The counterfactuals show that inflation targeting aﬀected the behaviour of inflation for the
largest part through the impact on expectations. Monetary policy shocks are estimated to have non-
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negligible variance, yet they contributed very little to inflation stabilization. Moreover, a monetary
policy that did not aﬀect private sector expectations but nevertheless stabilized inflation at its historical
level would have lead to a severe and prolonged recession. This result supports the claim that changes
in policy regime can dramatically aﬀect the economy dynamics by altering private agents’ decision-
making (Sargent, 1999), and the empirical observation that inflation targeting in Canada managed to
de-couple inflation expectations from recently observed inflation rates (Dodge, 2002).
As for the methodological contribution, our result that alternative approaches to build counter-
factuals can overturn the evaluation of the luck hypothesis illustrates the importance of allowing for a
vector of non-structural disturbances when filtering the historical business cycle shocks. The Kalman
filtering approach we adopt allows the data to choose what is the portion of business cycle volatility
that the DSGE model can explain. Our methodology to assess the impact of a change in the path
of the policy instrument separately from the impact of a change in the private sector expectation of
policy can be applied to measure the announcement eﬀect of any change in policymakers’ behaviour.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares alternative methods to build counterfac-
tual histories and presents our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 explains the
building of the Kalman-filtered counterfactual. Section 5 discusses the maximum likelihood estimation
of the model and builds counterfactuals histories to evaluate the role of the policy rule, the role of
policy shocks, and the role of credibility on Canadian inflation performance, and to assess the luck
hypothesis. The implications of alternative methodologies are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2 Counterfactual Histories to Evaluate the Impact of Policy Changes
A counterfactual history is defined by two components: a series of historical shocks εt and a counterfac-
tual law of motion. This section considers a baseline case to illustrate our empirical approach. Section
4 discusses the general case, and Appendix 7.3 provides the derivation of the equations in the following.
Let the rational expectation equilibrium law of motion for a linearized DSGE model be given
by the first order non-singular VAR process:
Yt = Γ1Yt−1 + Γ2εt (1)
where Yt = [yt, xt]0, yt is a vector of endogenous control variables, xt is a vector of endogenous state
variables, εt is vector of exogenous shocks randomly distributed. The VAR approach to generate a
counterfactual history starts with estimation of the matrices Γ1, Γ2, and uses the reduced-form model
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(1) to build the historical shocks [εt]Tt=1. Couterfactuals are built by changing the coeﬃcients in the row
of Γ1, Γ2 corresponding to the policy rule adopted, while expectations are assumed invariant to policy.
3 Benati and Surico (2009) have shown that the VAR approach can have low power in discriminating
between structural changes in the economy and changes in the exogenous shocks variance.
Our strategy is to derive the equilibrium law of motion (1) from estimation of a DSGE model,
and then use the DSGE reduced-form model to construct the historical shocks [εt]Tt=1. This approach
has been adopted by various authors, among which Arias, Hansen and Ohanian (2007), Benati and
Mumtaz (2008), Justiniano and Primiceri (2006), King and Rebelo (1998), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998), Stock and Watson (2003)4. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) use a similar methodology,
although the ’business cycle accounting’ they propose identifies time-varying wedges in equilibrium
decision-rules consistent with a whole family of models, rather than structural shocks from a uniquely
identified model. Because this approach estimates the structural coeﬃcients of the DSGE model, it
is possible to build the counterfactual law of motion by solving the DSGE model conditional on the
alternative policy. Therefore, all the elements of Γ1,Γ2 are allowed to change, and expectations are
model-consistent.
An important drawback of this methodology is that by construction it requires a small set of
structural shocks and the model internal propagation mechanism to explain all the volatility in the
data. It is an accounting approach that does not allow for deviations from the DSGE model law of
motion when building the model-consistent shocks vector. This requirement can be very taxing for
the stylized models used in the DSGE literature. The Kalman filtering approach (Christiano, Motto
and Rostagno, 2008, Ireland, 2004) allows for the existence of an additional vector of disturbances wt
uncorrelated with εt. The vector wt identifies sources of fluctuations beyond the shocks included in
the DSGE model, which are given a structural interpretation. The law of motion for the observable
variables is then:
Yt = Γ1Yt−1 + Γ2εt + wt (2)
In essence eq. (2) augments the DSGE model so that there exists a residual variance in the data that
the model is not called to explain in terms of movements of the structural shocks. This approach thus
3For applications of this approach, see Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Posen (1997), Canova and Gambetti
(2009), Sims and Zha (2006). It is possible to build VAR counterfactuals where expectations are policy-consistent, as in
Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004) and Primiceri (2005). But in this case there is no assurance that the VAR counterfactual
accounts exclusively for a change in the policy rule.
4These authors use the state-space representation of the equilibrium law of motion rather than the VAR representation.
The state-space representation does not require that the vector xt be observable to obtain the historical series εt. Ravenna
(2007) discusses conditions for a finite order VAR representation of a DSGE model equilibrium law of motion to exist.
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allows for part of the observable variables’ variance to be explained by the vector wt when estimating
the model-consistent shocks vector, while it uses exclusively the DSGE model to build a counterfactual
path with model-consistent expectations.
Empirical research using counterfactual histories to ascertain whether the change in the ob-
served time-series of a macroeconomic aggregate must be ascribed to a change in exogenous shocks
or behavioral parameters typically uses data before and after the observed change. We adopt a more
parsimonious approach, and only use data after the adoption of inflation targeting in Canada. Thus
we cannot discuss what was the cause of the observed change in inflation volatility before and after
the inflation targeting policy adoption - whether, for example, the volatility of exogenous shocks did
change across subsamples - but we can test whether the change in monetary policy was relevant or
not for the behaviour of inflation volatility in the inflation targeting period. It may very well be that
inflation targeting would have lowered inflation volatility in the earlier sample, or that the shocks from
the earlier sample would have lead to high inflation volatility despite the switch to inflation targeting.
These claims are distinct from the hypothesis we test, and are conditional on an estimated shocks’
vector that was never faced by the monetary authority in the inflation targeting period.
Our approach does not require estimation of the DSGE model over two subsamples - for the pre-
inflation targeting period, only an estimate of the policy rule is needed . To impose as few constraints
as possible on the data, we estimate the policy rule using a GMM estimator. The GMM estimator
allows the use of a larger data set, which is useful since a number of time series used in the DSGE
model estimation post-1991 are only available starting in 1984.5
3 The General Equilibrium Model
The Canadian economy is modeled as a small open economy with nominal price rigidities, along the
lines of the recent literature on monetary models of the international business cycle (see Bergin, 2003,
Gali and Monacelli, 2005, Kollmann, 2001). The domestic (H) sector utilizes labor to produce a
consumption-good basket that is both consumed by domestic households and exported to the foreign
(F ) sector, in exchange for a foreign-produced consumption good.
A fraction of households and domestic firms set respectively nominal wages according to the
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (1999) staggered contracts mechanism, and prices as in Calvo (1983). The
5To obtain comparable estimates of the policy rule coeﬃcients before and after the adoption of inflation tagerting, we
estimate the policy rule with GMM over the two subsample, and estimate the DSGE model parameters given the inflation
targeting policy rule estimates.
7
remaining fraction is assumed to follow a rule of thumb, so that price and wage setting is partially
backward-looking. Households’ preferences have a habit-persistence specification. These three features
improve the performance of sticky-price models, whose failure to generate plausible degrees of output
and inflation persistence and to match the empirical correlation between real wages and output is well
known (Fuhrer, 2000). Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Rabanal and Rubio Ramirez
(2005) provide evidence that nominal wage rigidity is at least as important as nominal price rigidity in
accounting for US and Euro area business cycle fluctuations. Finally, the model allows for short-term
incomplete pass-through from the foreign to the domestic price of imported goods.
3.1 Consumption Good Aggregates
Assume a continuum of infinitely lived households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Domestic households can
purchase a basket of diﬀerentiated home- and foreign-produced goods. The consumption aggregate Ct
combines the domestic (CH) and foreign (CF ) goods basket in the same proportions as household j
would choose:
Cjt = [(1− γ)
1
ρ (CjH,t)
ρ−1
ρ
+ γ
1
ρ (CjF,t)
ρ−1
ρ
]
ρ
ρ−1 (3)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the share of the foreign good and ρ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. The domestic good H and the foreign good F are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates
defined over a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] with elasticity of substitution
ϑ. Households allocate their expenditure optimally across goods. Pt, PH,t and PF,t indicate the price
indices for the aggregate, domestic and foreign good consumption basket.
3.2 Firms
The home production sector is made up of a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Domestic firms
produce goods by combining labor services supplied by households. Firms regard each household j’s
labor supply N jt as an imperfect substitute for the labor oﬀered by other households. A CES labor
aggregator Nt = (
R 1
0 N
j φφ−1
t dj)
φ−1
φ combines households’ labor services in the same proportions as firms
would optimally choose. The wage index Wt = (
R 1
0 W
j1−φ
t dj)
1
1−φ gives the least expenditure that buys
a unit of the labor index. Firm i optimal demand for each type of labor j, conditional on the total
demand for labor services Nt(i), is equal to:
N jt (i) = (
W jt
Wt
)−φNt(i) (4)
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The total cost of the diﬀerentiated labor services hired by firm i is
R 1
0 N
j
t (i)W
j
t dj = Nt(i)Wt. The firm
producing good i employs a CRS technology: Yt(i) = AtNt(i),where At is an aggregate productivity
shock. The firms’ cost minimization problem implies that when inputs quantities are chosen optimally
the real marginal cost MCt is independent of the scale of production. We adopt the hybrid pricing
model in Gali and Gertler (1999). As in the time-dependent Calvo (1983) pricing model, in every
period t firms adjust their prices with probability (1 − θp). A fraction (1 − ωp) of the price resetting
firms update the price optimally, while a fraction ωp follows a backward-looking rule of thumb. The
problem of the firm optimally setting the price at time t consists of choosing PH,t(i) to maximize
Et
∞X
s=0
(θpβ)sΛt,t+s
∙
PH,t(i)
PH,t+s
YH,t+s(i)−
MCNt+s
PH,t+s
YH,t+s(i)
¸
(5)
subject to
YH,t+s(i) =
∙
PH,t(i)
PH,t+s
¸−ϑ
CWt+s (6)
MCNt+s = PH,t+sMCt+s =
Wt+s
MPLt+s
(7)
where MCN is the nominal marginal cost, MPL is the marginal product of labor. In (6), YH,t+s(i)
is the demand function for firm i output at time t + s, conditional on the price set s periods in
advance at time t, PH,t(i). Market clearing ensures that YH,t(i) = CWt (i) ≡ CH,t(i) + C∗H,t(i) where
C∗H,t(i) = (
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ϑC∗H,t is foreign demand for good i, C
∗
H,t = γ
∗C∗t is foreign demand for domestic
exports and C∗t is the exogenously given foreign aggregate demand for imports. Aggregate world
demand is defined as CWt ≡ CH,t+C∗H,t. The stochastic discount factor between t and t+ s is βsΛt,t+s.
Backward looking firms update their price to the average level set in the most recent round of price
adjustment, P t−1, adjusted for the lagged domestically-produced goods inflation rate πH,t−1 :
PRTH,t (i) = PH,t−1(1 + πH,t−1)
Conditional on the shocks vector at time t, the rule of thumb price PRTH,t+k(i) converges to the optimal
price as k →∞. This hybrid model ensures that current inflation is determined partly by lagged and
partly by expected inflation. At the same time, contrary to the indexation model assumed, for example,
in Christiano et al. (2005), it does not constrain all firms to change prices every period.
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3.3 Households
Households’ preferences are described by the instantaneous utility function:
U jt =
(
[ln(Cjt − bC
j
t−1)]Dt −
cN j
1+η
t
1 + η
+ ν
Ã
M jt
Pt
!)
where Mt/Pt is real money balances, Nt is the amount of labor service supplied, Dt is an exogenous
preference shock that distorts the labor-leisure decision. Hall (1997) defines this shock as a shift in
”households’ choice between work in the market and time spent in non-market activities”. When
b > 0 preferences are characterized by habit persistence. State-contingent claims ensure consumption
levels are identical across households who supply diﬀerent amounts of labor services. The aggregate
consumption risk cannot be fully diversified, since on the international financial market the only asset
traded is a riskless nominal bond. Households maximize the expected discounted utility flow:
U j = E0
∞X
t=0
βtU jt (C
j
t , N
j
t ,
M jt
Pt
,Dt)
subject to eq. (3) and the budget constraint:
PtC
j
t +M
j
t + etv
∗
tB
∗j
t ++
−→v t
−→
B jt ≤W
j
t N
j
t +M
j
t−1 + etB
∗j
t−1 +B
j
t−1 +Π
j
t − τ t (8)
where et is the nominal exchange rate, v∗t is the price of a zero-coupon riskless bond priced in foreign
currency, B∗t is the amount of foreign asset purchased, Wt is the wage rate, Πj is the share of profit
from the monopolistic firms rebated to the household, and τ is a lump sum government tax. Each
element of the row vector −→v t represents the price of an asset that will pay one unit of currency in a
particular state of nature in period t+ 1. The corresponding element of
−→
B t represents the quantity of
such claims purchased by the household. Bt−1 indicates the value of the household portfolio of claims
against domestic residents given the current state of nature.
Households set the nominal wage W j in contracts which can be renegotiated with probability
(1−θw). Of the households resetting the wage contract, a fraction (1−ωw) updates the wage optimally,
while a fraction ωw follows a backward-looking rule of thumb. Eq. (4) and the index of aggregate
employment Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(i)di give household j
0s downward sloping demand function for its type of
labor:
N jt = (
W jt
Wt
)−φNt (9)
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As in the staggered wage adjustment model of Erceg et al. (1999) any household j optimally resetting
the wage at time t maximizes its utility functional with respect to the nominal wage W˜ jt , subject to
the sequence of budget constraints (eq. 8) and the labor demand function (eq. 9) at time t + s .
We assume the rule of thumb adopted by a fraction ωw of the wage-resetting households takes into
account the average nominal wage, the CPI inflation rate and the average contract duration 11−θw , as
in Rabanal (2001). Backward looking households update the wage to the average level prevalent across
all contracts at time t− 1, adjusted for the current inflation rate πt :
WRT
j
t =Wt−1(1 + πt)
1
1−θw (10)
For ωw → 0 the model converges to the Erceg et al. (1999) wage-updating mechanism. This hy-
brid model implies aggregate nominal wage inflation depends explicitly on current and expected CPI
inflation through the indexing rule (10).
3.4 Import Sector
We model incomplete pass-through of imported goods prices by assuming that the foreign-produced
good F is purchased by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms in the import sector as an
input for production (see Monacelli, 2005). Each firm z can costlessly diﬀerentiate the imported good
XF to produce a consumption good CF (z) using the production technology YF (z) = XF (z), where
XF (z) denotes the amount of input imported by firm z. The nominal marginal cost of producing one
unit of output is defined as MCNF,t(z) = etP
∗
F,t where P
∗
F,t is the foreign-currency price of XF . The
domestic-currency price PF (z) is set following the Calvo (1983) pricing model with a probability of
price re-optimization equal to (1− θF ) . The producer faces an aggregate demand schedule given by:
YF,t(z) =
∙
PF,t(z)
PF,t
¸−(
CF,t
where market clearing implies YF,t(z) = CF,t(z). This production structure generates deviations from
the law of one price in the short run, while asymptotically the pass-through from the price of the
imported good to the price of the consumption basket F is complete.
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3.5 Government Sector and Aggregate Shocks
The government budget is balanced in every period t. The central bank monetary policy is described
by the interest rate rule: ¡
1 + it
¢
(1 + iss)
=
∙
Et
µ
Πt+1
ΠSS
¶¸ωπ
(
YH,t
YH,SS
)ωy (11)
where ωπ, ωy ≥ 0 are the feedback coeﬃcients to deviations of the expected gross CPI inflation rate
Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt and domestic output from their steady state values ΠSS , YH,SS. We assume the policy-
maker adjusts the interest rate only gradually to the target rate it :
(1 + it) =
£¡
1 + it
¢¤(1−χ)
[(1 + it−1)]χ εi,t (12)
where χ ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of smoothing and the exogenous shock εi,t represents non-systematic
movements in the monetary policy instrument. The logarithm of the exogenous preference shock Dt,
technology shock At, aggregate foreign demand C∗t , and the world interest rate ı˜∗t and imports’ price
inflation P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1 follow a first order autoregressive stochastic process, with random innovation
εj,t ∼ N(0, σ2j ). The exogenous policy shock εi,t is assumed to have no serial correlation. Market
clearing conditions and aggregate equilibrium conditions are in Appendix 7.6.
4 Counterfactual Histories: Methodology
Write the linearized DSGE model equilibrium law of motion as:
ξt+1 = Fξt + vt+1 (13)
qt = H
0
ξt (14)
n+m×1ξt =
⎡
⎣
n×1ξ1t
m×1ξ2t
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ xt−1
zt
⎤
⎦ (15)
n+m×1vt =
⎡
⎣
n×10
m×1εt
⎤
⎦ (16)
n+m×n+mF =
⎡
⎣
n×nF 11 n×mF 12
m×n0 m×mF 22
⎤
⎦ (17)
r×n+mH 0 =
h
r×nH 01 r×mH 02
i
(18)
12
E(vtv0t) =
n+m×n+mQ =
⎡
⎣
n×n0 n×m0
m×n0 m×mΣ
⎤
⎦ (19)
E(vtv0τ ) = [0] for τ 6= t (20)
qt is an r × 1 vector of observable variables, which may include elements of both the endogenous
state vector xt and control vector yt. εt is a multivariate Gaussian stochastic process with covariance
matrix Σ and unconditional expectation E(εt) = 0. Capital letters denote matrices. The index in the
upper-left corner indicates the size of a matrix.
The law of motion in eqs. (13), (14) can be inverted to obtain the vectors ξ1t and ξ
2
t conditional
on a vector of observable variables qt. Given an initial condition ξ0 and matrices F, H 0 the state vector
ξt can be calculated from the recursion:
ξ1t = F
11ξ1t−1 + F
12ξ2t−1 (21)
ξ2t = (H
02)−1[qt −H 01ξ1t ] (22)
For H 02 to be invertible only m out of the r variables in the vector qt must be included. ξ2t is the
historical shocks vector consistent with the DSGE model and the observation vectors [q1...qt]. Eq.
(13) can be used to back out the corresponding series of innovations εt. We label this procedure the
’accounting approach’. Its mechanics imply that under the historical policy the model-simulated path
for the observables conditional on the historical vector ξ2t is identical to the data. Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2007) use the accounting approach to measure how much of the business cycle fluctuations
can be explained by each shock during historical episodes6.
The accounting approach constrains the structural shocks to explain all of the variance observed
in the data. We relax this assumption by assuming that the observable variables are described by the
vector qot :
qot = qt + wt (23)
where wt is an r × 1 Gaussian vector stochastic process with covariance matrix R:
E(wtw0t) = R ; E(wtw
0
τ ) = [0] for τ 6= t ; E(vtw0τ ) = [0] ∀ τ (24)
6Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan’s (2007) ’business cycle accounting’ identifies time-varying wedges in the equilibrium
decision-rules, rather than structural shocks, since the covariance matrix Σ is not restricted to be diagonal. The authors
show that a large class of models is equivalent to a prototype model with time-varying wedges.
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In the econometric literature wt is assumed to represent a measurement error vector. It can be in-
terpreted as summarizing the volatility in qot which is not explained by the DSGE model. For the
system defined by eqs. (13), (14) and (23), and given the assumptions in equations (15) to (20), (24)
we define the linear projection of ξt+1 on the sample [qo1...q
o
t ] and a constant as the Kalman filtered
estimate ξt+1|t and Pt+1|t the associated mean squared error (MSE). The Kalman smoothed estimate
ξt|T ≡ Eˆ(ξt|qo1...qoT ) of the vector ξt is based on the full sample of observable variables, and Pt|T is the
associated MSE.
A counterfactual history [q]Tt=1 is built by simulating the model in eqs. (13) and (14) conditional
on a counterfactual law of motion F 11, F 12,H 0 and on the estimate [ξ2t|T ]
T
t=1. Because the model includes
the vector of disturbances wt, simulation of the historical equilibrium law of motion F,H 0 conditional
on the filtered structural shocks in εt will not generate the historical data series. Part of the variance in
the observable qot is accounted for by wt, while the vector εt (and the implied ξ
2
t vector) only explains
the variance of the unobservable qt. Therefore any counterfactual history qt by construction generates
a counterfactual path for qt rather than qot . The law of iterated projections implies that the Kalman
smoothed estimate qt|T ≡ Eˆ(qt|qo1...qoT ) is equal to H 0ξt|T . The vector qt|T can be compared to the
counterfactual qt conditional on ξ
2
t+1|T , which is computed as:
ξt+1 ≡
⎡
⎣ ξ
1
t+1
ξ2t+1
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ F
11 F 12
0 I
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ ξ
1
t
ξ2t+1|T + eξ2t+1
⎤
⎦ (25)
qt = H
0
tξt (26)
where F 11, F 12,H 0 describe the counterfactual law of motion and ξt describes the counterfactual path
of the state variables. For eξ2t = 0 ∀ t the system in eqs. (25) and (26) simulates the economy dynamics
when only the law of motion is changed. In some instances it is useful for some of the eξ2t components
to be nonzero in order to build counterfactual histories conditional on alternative shocks series. Note
that by construction this method uses only the DSGE model in building a counterfactual history, since
all the variance in qt|T and qt is explained by the model structural shocks. The vector wt enters in the
estimation of these shocks.
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5 The Impact of Inflation Targeting
The building of the Kalman-filter counterfactuals proceeds as follows. First we estimate the monetary
policy rule coeﬃcients over the inflation targeting sample and over the earlier 1971-1990 sample using
a GMM estimator. Then we use the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function of the model in
eqs. (13), (14) and (23) conditional on the GMM estimates over the inflation targeting sample. The
maximum likelihood estimates are used to filter the historical shocks [ξ2t|T ]
T
t=1 and to compute counter-
factuals using eqs. (25) and (26) and the appropriate choice of F 11, F 12,H 0. A detailed description of
the data set and estimation procedure is contained in Appendices 7.1 and 7.2.
5.1 Estimation
5.1.1 Monetary Policy Rule
Canadian monetary policy in the period before and after the adoption of inflation targeting is estimated
on quarterly data using a two-stage GMM estimator with heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent covariance matrix. The orthogonality condition exploited in the GMM estimation is E[it −
(1 − χ)α − (1 − χ)ωππt+1 − (1 − χ)ωyyt − χit−1|ut] = 0 where α is a constant and ut is the set of
instruments. It is obtained by combining eqs. (11), (12) and taking a loglinear approximation around
the steady state. The instruments set is similar to the one used by Clarida et al. (1998), and includes:
four lags of the interest rate, inflation rate, money supply growth rate and three lags of the Hodrick-
Prescott filtered output. Including lagged values of the real exchange rate among the regressors did
not significantly modify the results.
The inflation targeting sample runs from 1992:1 to 2005:1. Inflation targeting was formally
adopted in the first quarter of 1991, and the first target was set to reduce CPI inflation in the 1 to 3
percent range by the end of 1995, although inflation averaged 2% already in the first year. Before the
announcement of specific inflation targets, the Bank of Canada had embarked in a three-year campaign
to promote price stability as the long term objective of monetary policy, though it made little headway
against the momentum in inflation expectations that had built up. In the fourth quarter of 1990
inflation was still at 4.2%. The pre-inflation targeting sample on which ωπ, ωy, χ, α are estimated
runs from 1971:1 (following the eight year period ending in 1970 when Canada pegged its exchange
rate to the US dollar) to 1990:4. Table 1 reports the estimates, showing that in the inflation targeting
period the weight on expected inflation increased from 1.09 to 2.16, while the weight on the HP-filtered
output measure dropped from 1.21 to 0.27. The estimate of the coeﬃcient χ on lagged interest rate
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remained very high across subsamples. All estimated coeﬃcients are significant at least at the 5%
confidence level.
5.1.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We estimate the small open economy model using a maximum likelihood estimator as in Bergin (2003)
and Ireland (2004). The object of the estimation is the state-space representation of the loglinear
approximation to the DSGE model law of motion, as specified in eqs. (13), (14) and (23). The
likelihood function for the sample [qot ]Tt=1 can be constructed using the Kalman filter, and depends
nonlinearly on the structural parameters. The Sims (1999) algorithm is used to search for values of the
DSGE model parameters and of the matrix R that will maximize the likelihood function.
The DSGE model parameters are estimated over the 1991:1 to 2007:2 sample using the observed
data vector for 10 variables:
qot = [YH,t, πt, it, St, et/et−1, C
∗
H,t, ı˜
∗
t , ξt, Nt, MCt]
o
where the o superscript indicates that the observation available for variable xj,t is given by xoj,t = xj,t+
wj,t. The output variable YH,t is measured by the sum of constant-price consumption and net exports,
consistent with the model definition of output that includes only domestic and foreign consumption
of the home produced good: YH,t = CH,t + C∗H,t. Canadian real GDP over the same sample is about
20% less volatile, and shows a very similar pattern of correlations with the other macroeconomic
aggregates. The inflation measure πt is the seasonally adjusted CPI net of indirect taxes. The interest
rate it is the 3-month T-bill rate, although nearly identical results are obtained with the overnight
rate. The terms of trade series St = PF,t/PH,t is the ratio of the Laspeyres index for import and export
prices. Nominal exchange rate depreciation et/et−1 is obtained from the Canadian/US dollar exchange
rate (trade with the US accounts for about 80% of total Canadian international trade). The exports
series C∗H,t is given by the Canadian constant-price export index for goods and services. The foreign
interest rate ı˜∗t is the US 3-month T-Bill quarterly yield. Nominal wage inflation ξt is measured by
the average hourly earnings for the non-farm sector, including government but excluding the defense
and not-for-profit sectors. The series for total labor hours Nt is built using employment and average
weekly hours of the same non-farm sector. The real marginal cost MCt is obtained from the unit
labor cost series for the business sector discounted by the appropriate price deflator. All series are
measured as log-deviations from the steady state, except for YH,t, C∗H,t, Nt and MCt which are logged
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and Hodrick-Prescott filtered.7
The covariance matrix R for the shocks vector:
wt = [wYH,t , wπt , wit , wSt , wet/et−1 , wC∗H,t , wı˜∗t , wξt , wNt , wMCt ]
is assumed to be diagonal. Ireland (2004) suggests a more flexible specification, allowing for a VAR
structure of the wt components. We experimented with this specification, but the ML estimates of
the VAR coeﬃcients and cross-correlations were for the large part not significant, while the robustness
of the search algorithm to the initial starting value decreased considerably. The covariance matrix
Σ of the structural shocks innovations is assumed diagonal, except for the submatrix describing the
covariances for the foreign shocks C∗t , ı˜∗t and P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1. The non-zero correlation across these shocks
allows the model to generate a richer dynamics for the foreign sector, and at the same time is a more
parsimonious specification than a full blown VAR system.
The variance of the wt disturbance for ı˜∗t cannot be separately identified from the variance of the
shock itself, and we constrain the corresponding element in the R matrix to be zero. We also constrain
to zero the variance of the wt disturbance for it which cannot be separately identified from the variance
of the policy shock εi,t. The parameters η and φ are not identified. To estimate η, the inverse of the
steady state labor supply elasticity, the value of the steady state wage markup φ/(φ − 1) is assumed
equal to 10%, implying φ = 11. Amato and Laubach (1999) estimate a sticky price/sticky wage model
of the US economy and find a value of φ equal to 8.5 with a standard deviation of 6.1. We use the
model’s steady state restrictions to set prior to estimation some additional parameters for which the
data contain only limited information. The quarterly discount factor β is set to 0.99, which implies a
steady state real world interest rate of 4 percent. The foreign good share γ is equal to the steady state
ratio between imports and domestic output, and is set to 0.35, the average Canadian import/output
ratio over the inflation targeting sample. Finally, the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods
ϑ is set equal to 6, so that the markup in a flexible-price steady state is 20% (Gali and Monacelli,
2005).
Parameter Estimates ML estimates and standard errors for 30 parameters are reported in Table
2. Most of the parameters are estimated with a low level of uncertainty, including the elements of
the covariance matrix R. The estimate of the standard deviations for the wt vector components is
7We chose to filter also the series forMCt since it is characterized by a strong downward trend throughout the inflation
targeting period that the DSGE model is not built to explain.
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of the same order of magnitude as the volatility estimate for some of the structural shocks in ξ2t .
This suggests there are important features in the data that the DSGE model propagation mechanism
cannot account for. The standard deviation of the preference shock innovation is σd = 5.68. This value
is large compared to the other disturbances, but it is not unusual for models with nominal rigidities
to require volatile shocks to fit aggregate data. Rabanal and Rubio Ramirez (2005) estimation of a
sticky price/sticky wage model on US data yields a standard deviation of the taste shock twice as large
(σd = 11.88). Del Negro et al. (2006) estimate a preference shock standard deviation of 40.54 within
a large-scale New Keynesian model of the US economy. Hall’s (1997) empirical decomposition shows
that most of the volatility in U.S. labor hours can be attributed to a preference shift between market
and non-market activities, and is consistent with the empirical evidence in Eichenbaum, Hansen and
Singleton (1988) on the co-movements of real wages, consumption and work eﬀort.
The estimates for the price and wage setting parameters deserve an extended comment. The
estimates for θw imply an average wage contract duration of five quarters, with about two thirds of
the contracts being reset at the optimal wage . The average length of wage settlements in Canada over
the 1991-2000 period is 29.77 months (Longworth, 2002), but this figure does not include contracts in
the non-unionized sector, and worker’s unionization in Canada has been declining. Additionally, the
estimate for θw implies a measure for the interval between wage adjustment, rather than the interval
between contract renegotiations.
The estimate for θF implies an average price duration for imported good of 3.75 quarters. The
estimate of the price setting probability θp for the domestic production sector implies an implausibly
long average price duration of 16 quarters. In addition, a fraction ωp close to 0.9 of the prices are
adjusted according to rule of thumb behaviour. When estimating DSGEmodel on aggregate US postwar
data, other authors have obtained estimates in the 0.85−0.9 range for θp and in the 0.82−0.96 range for
the degree of indexation to past prices among the non-reoptimizing firms (Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez,
2005, Smets and Wouters, 2005). A comparison with the full-indexation price updating mechanism in
Chistiano et al. (2005) is useful to illustrate the implications of the ML estimated parameters. These
authors assume that a fraction of the firms can reset the price to the optimal level, while the remaining
fraction indexes to lagged CPI inflation. Given the timing assumptions, the loglinear equilibrium
condition for inflation is:
πH,t = γ∗bπH,t−1 + γ
∗
fEt−1πH,t+1 +
(1− βθp)(1− θp)
(1 + β)θp
Et−1mct (27)
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γ∗b =
1
1 + β
; γ∗f =
β
1 + β
where lower case letters indicate log-deviations from the steady state. Since any plausible parameteri-
zation for β implies a value close to 1 to be consistent with estimates of the steady state real interest
rate, the Christiano et al. (2005) inflation equation necessarily assigns nearly identical weights γ∗b and
γ∗f to lagged and expected inflation, and a weight whose value is close to 1/2. The Gali and Gertler
(1999) rule-of-thumb price resetting mechanism we adopt results in the loglinear equilibrium condition:
πH,t = γbπH,t−1 + γfEtπH,t+1 +
(1− ω)(1− θp)(1− βθp)
Ψ
mct (28)
γb =
ω
Ψ
; γf =
βθp
Ψ
; Ψ = θp + ω[1− θp(1− β)]
The estimates in table 2 imply γb = 0.49 and γf = 0.51, that is coeﬃcients on lagged and expected
inflation that are virtually identical to the ones that appear in the price indexation model (27). There-
fore both price updating mechanisms generate similar reduced form dynamics for inflation. But to
be consistent with the reduced form favored by the data, both the rule of thumb model and the price
indexation model imply an average price duration inconsistent with the microeconomic evidence, too
long for the first one (16 quarters), too short for the second one (1 quarter). We interpret this result
as evidence that neither of the two price resetting mechanism can be considered fully structural.
Likelihood Ratio Tests We use the likelihood ratio to compare the fit of the estimated model to
a state-space model where none of the DSGE restrictions is imposed. This is a strategy used by Bergin
(2003) to evaluate the performance of the estimated model against an unrestricted model which takes
the same reduced form, and therefore nests the DSGE model.
Estimation of the unrestricted model involves finding a parameterization for the matrices
F, H, Q, R that maximizes the likelihood function. Since none of the DSGE model cross-equation
restrictions is imposed, the unconstrained model is bound to have a higher likelihood than the con-
strained DSGE model. The likelihood ratio test evaluates the statistical significance of the improvement
in likelihood obtained by removing the DSGE model restrictions. The test accounts for the degrees of
freedom, equal to the number of entries in F, H and in the lower triangular portion of the covariance
matrices Q, R,minus the number of estimated parameters in the restricted model. Results are reported
in table 3. The test cannot reject the DSGE model restrictions, the p-value of the null hypothesis being
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equal to 0.23.
The result that the unconstrained model does not perform significantly better compared to the
hybrid DSGE model is in part to be attributed to the degrees of freedom allowed by the additional
vector of disturbances wt. The relevance of the wt vector can be evaluated comparing the estimated
DSGE model to a model where the variance of (some components of) wt is set to zero. Since the model
has only six structural shocks, at least four components of wt must have non-zero variance to avoid
stochastic singularity when estimating the model over the 10-variables data set. Table 3 shows the
likelihood ratio test result when the non-zero variance components of wt are [wSt , wet/et−1 , wξt , wNt ].
The zero-variance restrictions on the matrix R can be rejected at any significance level. Any other
choice of zero-variance restriction results in an even lower likelihood.
The likelihood ratio can also be used to evaluate the role of nominal rigidities in the model
performance. Table 3 provides the likelihood ratio for the restricted model where domestic wages and
prices are reset optimally in every period (the parameters θp, θw, ωp, ωw are restricted to be equal to
zero) and the benchmark hybrid model. The restrictions are rejected, implying that nominal rigidities
play a statistically significant role in fitting the data. Finally, we test separately for the significance of
the nominal rigidity in the foreign good import sector. This test is meant to discriminate between the
producer and consumer currency-pricing hypothesis for the imported good. A value of θF = 0 implies
instantaneous, complete pass-though of foreign price movements. This restriction can be rejected at
any level of significance, as shown in the last line of table 3.
5.1.3 Structural Shocks Estimate
The Kalman-smoothed estimate of the structural shocks over the 1991:1-2007:2 sample is in figure 1,
together with ±1 root mean square error (RMSE) bands. The foreign interest rate shock ı˜∗t has no
RMSE band since is included among the observables. We assume no prior information is available at
time t = 0, and the recursion starts with ξ1|0 = E(ξ1) and P1|0 = E{[ξ1 −E(ξ1)][ξ1 −E(ξ1)]0}.
The technology disturbance is on average negative until 1994, then takes both negative and
positive values throughout the remaining sample. This behaviour is not at odds with the strong
Canadian output expansion in the 1990s. It is consistent with the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series for
output used in the estimation, and with output gap estimates published by the Bank of Canada in its
Monetary Policy Report, which imply an increase in both output and potential output in this period.
Up to 1995 the data also imply a large and persistently negative preference shock, contributing to the
severity of the recession in the early 1990s. The preference shock is mostly negative throughout the
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1990s, possibly proxing for the fiscal consolidation during part of the decade. The monetary policy
shock is small over all the sample. The estimates indicate that policy shocks were more volatile in the
early years of inflation targeting, while in the 2000 to 2002 period the monetary authority set lower
interest rates then warranted by the policy rule.
Figure 2 plots the historical data together with the smoothed estimate qt|T for the variables
YH,t, it, St, C∗H,t
8. The ±1 RMSE error bands for qt|T are computed from MSEqt|T ≡ E{[qt− qt|T ][qt−
qt|T ]0} = H 0Pt|TH +R.
5.2 The Luck Hypothesis and the Cost of Inflation Targeting
The first thought experiment compares the smoothed estimate of the historical annual CPI inflation
πt|T with the counterfactual path πt under the hypothesis that inflation targeting had not been adopted
in 1991 (figure 3). It assumes ξ2t = ξ
2
t|T and that F
11, F 12,H 0 are computed conditional on the estimated
pre-inflation targeting policy rule. We assume identical long-term inflation goals under the two regimes.
Table 4 reports statistics to compare the two sample paths. The second row of table 4 shows that
inflation targeting did not lower the realized volatility of inflation in the 1991 - 2007 period. What is
remarkable is that while the volatility of inflation is virtually identical under the two policies conditional
on the Kalman-smoothed shocks vector ξ2t|T for the sample, the population volatility computed from
the ML estimate of the shocks’ covariance matrix bQ is more than 60% higher under the counterfactual
policy than in the inflation targeting regime. In other words, the historical shock vector was such
that the policy rule had no impact on inflation volatility, even if ex-ante we would expect a change in
inflation volatility.
Even if it did not aﬀect significantly the volatility, the inflation targeting policy may still have
had an important impact on the sample level of inflation, contributing to keeping it low. The last two
rows of table 4 illustrate this point. Over the whole sample, inflation would have been on average 40%
higher under the counterfactual policy. The level increase is even larger for the period following 2003.
Since the average level of inflation is low, a 40% increase in inflation translates in an average inflation
diﬀerential between the counterfactual and historical level of only 0.43 percentage points.
The Bank of Canada success in reducing inflation was associated by some critics with a high
cost in terms of unemployment (Fortin, 1996). But it is by no means clear that the 10% unemployment
rate reached in the early 1990s could be avoided using a diﬀerent monetary policy (Mishkin and Posen,
8 If the estimate for qt is computed from the Kalman filtered series ξt|t−1 , rather than the Kalman smoothed series
ξt|T , the estimate qt|t−1 has the interpretation of a forecast and is equal to the forecast q
o
t|t−1 since Et−1(wt) = 0.
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1997). In the same period world oil markets created inflationary pressures, while low commodity prices
harmed Canadian exports. The output counterfactual (figure 3) shows the inflation targeting policy
imposed a substantial cost in the period 1992-1994, when the extra output loss averaged slightly less
than 0.5% of trend output per quarter.
Overall, it appears that monetary policy was largely irrelevant for inflation volatility, and helped
to keep the inflation level lower after 2003. To assess the luck hypothesis, the appropriate question to
ask is how likely a path of inflation as observed in the counterfactual history would have been under
inflation targeting. To this end, we use the DSGE model to evaluate the probability of observing a
given range of (smoothed) inflation values in any time t conditional on inflation targeting. Figure
3 plots the inflation unconditional 0.84 standard deviations bound above the mean computed from
simulating the DSGE model under inflation targeting. Since the vector qt has a multivariate normal
distribution, in the ergodic state 80% of the πt realizations will fall below the 0.84 standard deviations
bound. The counterfactual inflation path lies above the 0.84 standard deviations bound in 15 periods
over the sample. Yet in a long enough sample, inflation realizations as large as desired will occur even
conditional on inflation targeting. Table 5 reports the results of a Monte Carlo exercise computing the
probability of observing a given number n of inflation realizations above the 80% probability bound for
the inflation targeting policy-maker over a sample as long as the 1991 to 2007 period. Would chance
alone allow the economy to experience the performance of the non-inflation targeting policy - as many
as 15 inflation observations above the 80% probability bound over 66 quarters? This event would not
be unlikely at all: it would occur with a probability of 0.38. Even to generate the 9 consecutive inflation
observation above the 0.84 standard deviations bound, as occurs in the counterfactual experiment
between 2000:1 and 2002:1, the inflation-targeting central bank would not need much bad luck: such
an event would be observed in 35% of the samples.
Since the shift to inflation targeting does generate a large decrease in the expected inflation
volatility, what drives the result that in the sample the inflation behaviour is similar regardless of the
monetary regime? After 1991 the estimated weights on the two variables entering the monetary reaction
function, π and y, change in opposite directions. As a consequence, shocks that result in the model in
a high negative correlation between inflation and output have the largest impact on the behaviour of
policy, and ultimately on the counterfactual inflation time series. Table 6 shows the correlation between
inflation and output in a hypothetical Canadian economy where all the business cycle volatility were
generated by a single shock. Technology, preference and foreign demand shocks generate a very high
negative correlation. If these shocks play a suﬃciently large role in explaining the inflation volatility,
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we would expect the counterfactual inflation time series to be strongly aﬀected by the change in policy.
9 This is the case in the estimated model, where inflation volatility under the counterfactual policy is
more than 60% higher than in the inflation targeting regime when computed from the ML estimate of
the shocks’ covariance matrix Q. Using the ML estimate bQ, the forecast error variance explained by the
shocks ı˜∗t , P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, εit - that do not generate a strong negative correlation for inflation and output
- is between 77% and 79%. In the 1991:1 to 2007:2 sample, where the sample covariance matrix across
the shocks is bbQ = 1TΣTt=1bvtbv0t, the variance explained by the same shocks is for most orthogonalizations
above 90%.10 As a consequence, a change in the policy rule has a smaller than expected impact on the
inflation time series over the sample. Had, for example, the technology or preference shock played a
larger role in explaining the inflation behaviour over the sample, the shift to inflation targeting would
have resulted in a larger divergence between the historical and counterfactual inflation path.
Obviously the inflation behaviour results are also dependent on the parameter estimates. The
estimates for θp and ωp in the price-adjustment equation imply inflation is very inertial, and could
potentially limit the sensitivity of inflation to the policy rule. Table 4 shows that the large share of
rule-of-thumb firms has only a small impact on the result. In an economy with no rule-of-thumb firms
(implying γb = 0 and γf = 0.99 in eq. 28) the counterfactual policy would have implied an increase in
inflation volatility of only 8%. Finally, it is legitimate to ask whether, given the Kalman-filtered shocks
vector ξ2t|T , the DSGE model is able to generate higher inflation volatility at all. This is indeed the
case. Table 4 includes the result from the counterfactual experiment conducted in an economy with a
higher steady-state labor supply elasticity 1/η, increasing from 0.38 to 1. In this economy the sample
volatility would increase more than twofold relative to the inflation targeting policy case. 11
In summary, the estimation shows that the inflation path under the earlier monetary policy
would have had a high likelihood of being generated also by an inflation targeting monetary policy.
Chance alone resulted in a lower volatility of inflation over the period.
9This statement is not necessarily true in a DSGE model, since the correlation between inflation and output is endoge-
nous to the choice of policy. For the estimated model though the statement is accurate.
10Since the estimation imposes overidentifying restrictions, the ML estimate eQ can diﬀer from the covariance matrix
of the sample shocks 1T Σ
T
t=1evtev0t. Note that since the covariance matrix is not diagonal, the fraction of inflation variance
attributable to each innovation depends on their order of preference. We assume foreign shocks are exogenous from
Canada’s point of view, while Canadian shocks do not aﬀect the rest of the world. The ordering of the domestic shocks
does not alter the outcome of the variance decomposition exercise, and these results are not reported.
11This result is provided to show that there exist model parameterizations which can imply a large impact of policy
on inflation volatility conditional on the estimated sample shocks vector. It does not imply that the result on the impact
of inflation targeting is extremely sensitive to the estimated parameters, since for diﬀerent parameter estimates the
Kalman-smoothed shocks vector would be diﬀerent as well.
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5.3 The Impact of Policy Shocks
The second counterfactual examines the impact of policy shocks in Canada by simulating an economy
conditional on the inflation targeting policy but setting to zero the monetary policy disturbance (figure
4). The counterfactual assumes F 11 = F 11, F 12 = F 12,H 0 = H 0. We set the jth component of the
vector eξ2t , corresponding to the policy shock εi,t, equal to −ξ2jt|T so that ξ2jt = 0 ∀ t. The vector composed
of all the elements of ξ2t except the jth one, ξ
2−j
t , is unchanged and equal to ξ
2−j
t|T .
The impact of policy shocks on inflation is limited over the sample, of the order of a quarter
of a percentage point. Unexpected movements in monetary policy played a more important role in
output dynamics. By lowering the interest rate level, they contributed to keeping output above trend
over the 2002-2005 period. The improvement in output is as high as 1%. The counterfactuals show
that the non-systematic component of monetary policy did not carry any weight for the poor output
performance in the early 1990s.
5.4 The Impact of Credibility
Central banks adopting inflation targeting frameworks consider the achieved macroeconomic stability,
at least in part, a result of the increased credibility of the policy commitment to inflation stabilization.
Some authors (see Kuttner and Posen, 1999) argue instead that the adoption of inflation targeting
simply indicates the central bank’s shift towards a greater conservatism with respect to the inflation
goal, with increased credibility and transparency playing a minor role for the policy’s outcome.
The third counterfactual evaluates the role of the inflation targeting credibility in Canadian’s
inflation performance since 1991 by building a history under the assumption that the shift in monetary
policy occurred but was not believed by the private sector (figure 5). It assumes ξ2t = ξ
2
t|T . The
matrices F 11, F 12,H 0 are built under the hypothesis that the monetary authority adjusts interest rates
according to the estimated post-1991 inflation targeting policy (F 11 = F 11, F 12 = F 12,H 0 = H 0), while
the private sector expectation eEpst [st+1] of any variable st is conditioned on the belief the central bank
adopts the policy rule estimated for the earlier period. Thus, while the actual policy changes relative
to the pre-inflation targeting period, the perceived policy used to form the private sector’s expectation
is unchanged. Eﬀectively, the private sector interprets as non-systematic movements in the interest
rate εpsi,t what truly is the sum of a policy shock and the distance between the interest rate implied by
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the true and believed policy rule:
it − {(1− χps)[ωpsπ eEpst πt+1 + ωpsy yt] + χpsit−1} = εpsi,t
= εi,t + (χcb − χp)it−1
+[(1− χcb)ωcby − (1− χps)ωpsy ]yt
+[(1− χcb)ωcbπ Ecbt πt+1 − (1− χps)ωpsπ eEpst πt+1]
where the index ps indicates the private sector believes, the index cb indicates the true value of a
parameter in the central bank policy rule, and we assume the central bank’s expectation of inflation is
model-consistent: Ecbt πt+1 = Etπt+1. Appendix 7.4 describes the equilibrium concept adopted to solve
the DSGE model when the private sector holds incorrect believes.
Figure 5 shows that despite the monetary authority increased aggressiveness towards inflation, a
non-credible policy would achieve an inflation path very close to the one under the assumption inflation
targeting had not been introduced at all (shown in figure 3), that is, under a less inflation-averse, but
fully credible policy. By and large, the experiment shows that whatever change in inflation dynamics
occurred over the inflation targeting period must be attributed to the change in the perceived policy.
At the same time, the non-credible inflation targeting regime would not lead to as large a stabilization
of output as the credible non-inflation targeting regime. The counterfactual shows that conditional on
the shocks vector the largest part of the change in inflation dynamics after 1991 originated from the
expectation channel: the private sector adjusting its behaviour given the belief that the central bank’s
stance against inflation has become more aggressive.
To measure the gain from the expectation channel, we build a fourth counterfactual assuming
the monetary authority still follows the inflation targeting policy without being believed by the private
sector - but at each time t adjusts the nominal interest rate to bring inflation to its historical level
(figure 5). The counterfactual assumes the same matrices F 11, F 12,H 0 as in the previous exercise whileeξ2jt is computed to ensure πt = πt. Appendix 7.5 provides the recursion to build the appropriate ξ2jt .
The counterfactual history describes an economy where the central bank achieves the given historical
inflation path by actually changing the path of the interest rate through surprise policy interventions,
rather than relying on its commitment to a policy rule to adjust the interest rate in response to the
state of the economy.
Figure 5 shows the implied path of output. After 1996, output decreases persistently and dra-
matically. In the counterfactual, when faced with inflationary shocks the monetary authority raises
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interest rates and forces the economy into a severe recession to be able to achieve the inflation target
path. Firms’ expect policy to be more accommodative towards inflation than it really is, and the incor-
rect believes would lead firms to set persistently higher prices, ceteris paribus. The central bank reacts
with unexpected increases in the nominal interest rate, that translate in real interest rate increases,
to curb demand and the firms’ inflationary behaviour. Because only 6% of the prices are updated in
every period, incorrect believes are very persistent in the economy, and result in a prolonged recession.
The distance between the historical and counterfactual output represents the gain from cred-
ibility: the extra movement in output relative to the one a credible central bank, achieving the same
inflation rate, would have experienced. Ex-ante, the distance can be positive or negative, depending
on the combination of shocks hitting the economy. Given the Kalman-smoothed shocks, it leads to a
prolonged recession in the sample.
5.5 Alternative Methods to Build Counterfactuals
Figure 6 compares the baseline Kalman filtering method to two alternative methodologies to build a
counterfactual inflation series conditional on the pre-inflation targeting policy. The top panel plots the
result from an exercise closer to the accounting approach. The shocks vector ξ2t|T is Kalman-filtered
using the DSGE model estimates in table 2 but assuming the only non-zero variance components of wt
are [wSt , wet/et−1 , wξt , wNt ]. This assumption allows using the same 10 data series to filter shocks as
in the benchmark model. This fifth counterfactual is then obtained from the recursion in eqs. (21) and
(22) assuming F 11, F 12,H 0 are built conditional on the estimated pre-inflation targeting policy rule.
The accounting method implies a shocks vector ξ2t with a larger variance, and this in turn returns a
counterfactual path for inflation which is much more volatile than the counterfactual smoothed estimate
of inflation in figure 3. By construction, the Kalman filter methodology returns a more conservative
counterfactual path since a larger portion of the data volatility is explained by the vector wt. At the
same time, since the volatility of the unobserved component wπt is constrained to 0 in this exercise, the
counterfactual path must be compared to the observed historical path πot - which has a comparatively
higher variance than the smoothed estimate πt. Nevertheless, the accounting method would imply a
very substantial impact of the monetary policy shift on inflation dynamics. Over the whole sample,
inflation volatility would increase by 59% relative to the historical volatility. The full-fledged Kalman-
smoothed counterfactual implied an increase of only 1%.
The bottom panel of figure 6 still relies on the DSGE model, but shows a counterfactual
close in method to the VAR approach. The sixth counterfactual assumes ξ2t = ξ
2
t|T . The matrices
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F 11, F 12,H 0 are built under the hypothesis that the monetary authority adjusts interest rates according
to the estimated pre-1991 policy, while the private sector believes the inflation targeting policy is being
implemented. The solution method for the DSGE model law of motion is the same as the one used
to evaluate the role of credibility. As in the VAR approach, the monetary authority changes its policy
in the counterfactual, but this change is not allowed to aﬀect the private sector’s expectations. This
methodology implies that counterfactual inflation would have followed very closely the historical path,
the maximum distance being less than 0.2% in any period - and that inflation targeting played virtually
no role in stabilizing inflation.
6 Conclusions
Industrial countries over the last two decades have experienced lower and more stable inflation - in
some countries, as the US, together with increased output stability. This paper considers the inflation
performance of an early and successful inflation targeter, Canada, to investigate whether the recent
period of inflation stability can be explained by good luck - a favorable combination of business cycle
shocks - rather than by the shift in the management of monetary policy
Contrary to a vast literature on the impact of inflation targeting, our estimates show that with
a high probability good luck can explain the low inflation volatility throughout the inflation targeting
period in Canada. The inflation targeting policy could, with a high probability of 35%, have resulted in
an inflation path as volatile as the one generated by the pre-inflation targeting policymaker conditional
on the estimated business cycle shocks for the sample. We do not interpret the evidence for the luck
hypothesis as implying that monetary policymaking is irrelevant: simply, inflation targeting has not
been put to test by shocks generating a large enough trade-oﬀ for the policymaker. The counterfactual
is built from an estimated DSGE model which predicts a much lower variance of inflation under inflation
targeting, implying the inflation realizations generated by the counterfactual economy are ex-ante an
unlikely event. Our estimates identify the larger than average weight of innovations in imported goods’
inflation, domestic interest rates and foreign interest rates in explaining CPI inflation volatility over
the inflation targeting period as driving the luck hypothesis result. At the same time, the introduction
of inflation targeting may have played an important role in lowering average inflation by anchoring
long term expectations, an issue that is clearly of utmost importance but cannot be addressed by our
estimation exercise.
We introduce a method to evaluate the impact of policy announcements’ credibility, and show
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that the inflation stabilization after 1991 is accounted for the most part by the credible announcement
of an inflation target (a shift in the perceived policy) rather than by the change in the behaviour of
the interest rate (a shift in the actual policy). We show that a non-credible inflation targeting policy
that stabilized inflation at its historical level would have generated a prolonged recession. This result
supports the claim that changes in policy regime can dramatically aﬀect the economy dynamics by
altering private agents’ decision making (Sargent, 1999).
We obtain our results by Kalman-filtering the historical vector of structural disturbances from a
maximum likelihood-estimated DSGE model. We provide a comparison with alternative methodologies
to build counterfactual histories and show that forcing the DSGE model to explain all the volatility
in the data would overturn the result from the counterfactual exercise, while neglecting the policy
impact on expectations - as in the literature using reduced-form VAR models - would bias downward
the impact of inflation targeting.
The drawback of using a structural model to build counterfactuals is reliance on strong assump-
tions on the economy’s shocks propagation mechanism. The DSGE model provides the lens through
which the data are read to filter the historical shocks series, and the law of motion to build coun-
terfactuals. Yet our estimation allows the data, rather than exogenous assumptions, to select the
appropriate model among a number of competing candidates. The estimated model encompasses, for
example, economies with a complete pass-through import sector, RBC flexible-prices economies (where
alternative monetary policies would be irrelevant), and economies with backward-looking final goods’
pricing (where the impact of credibility would be greatly diminished). Finally, while the building of a
counterfactual history wholly depends on the internal working of the DSGE model, the hybrid model
approach helps mitigating potential model mis-specification in filtering the shocks. The question of
how to assess policy changes ensuring robustness to a wider range of modeling assumptions is open for
future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data Sources and Definitions
All data are sampled at quarterly frequency. Growth, inflation and interest rates are not annualized. Unless
otherwise specified, data for Canada is obtained from the CANSIM database, and US data is obtained from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database.
Canada Output: Constant prices chain-weighted GDP, SA. Consumption: Constant prices chain-
weighted personal consumption expenditure, SA. Exports: constant prices chain-weighted exports of goods and
services, SA. Imports: constant prices chain-weighted imports of goods and services, SA. Interest rate: Three-
month Treasury bill tender rate, monthly average. Core inflation (CPIX): all items CPI less the eight most volatile
components and the eﬀect of indirect tax. Inflation net of indirect taxes: all items CPI excluding the eﬀect of
indirect taxes, SA. Inflation: all items CPI, SA (OECD Economic Outlook). Money supply: Bank of Canada
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M2 definition. Labor productivity: output per man-hour, business sector, SA. Import prices: Laspeyeres fixed
weight import unit value index, BOP basis, SA. Export prices: Laspeyeres fixed weight export unit value index,
BOP basis, SA. Nominal exchange rate: Canadian Dollar to US Dollar exchange rate (IMF-IFS). Nominal wage
inflation: average hourly earnings for hourly-paid employees, business sector (includes government and excludes
not-for-profit and defense sectors), SA. Hours: average weekly hours for hourly-paid employees including overtime,
business sector, SA. Emplyment: total payroll employment, business sector, SA. Unit labor cost: business sector,
SA. Business sector price index: implicit price deflator, SA.
US Interest rate: Three-month treasury bill secondary market rate. Output: Constant prices chain-
weighted GDP non-farm business sector, SA (Bureau of Economic Analysis).
7.2 Policy Rule Estimation
All data are sampled at quarterly frequency. Growth, inflation and interest rates are not annualized. Over both
samples, yt is given by HP-filtered constant-prices GDP, which approximates well the Bank of Canada output
gap measure published in the Monetary Policy Reports. The policy interest rate during the inflation targeting
period is the overnight rate, but since this series is only available since 1975 we measure it with the 3-month
Canadian T-bill rate. The two rates are very highly correlated. Since inflation targeting was adopted, the Bank of
Canada uses a measure of inflation excluding the impact of indirect taxes and the eight most volatile components
as an operational target, and this is the inflation rate used for the πt series. In the earlier sample the measure
of inflation πt is built using the seasonally adjusted total CPI measure net of indirect taxes, available starting
in January 1984, and the seasonally adjusted total CPI index, which starts as early as 1961. Specifications of
the policy rule allowing for the monetary authority to react to the US-Canadian dollar exchange resulted in an
estimated feedback coeﬃcient not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
7.3 VAR Representation of DSGE models
The DSGE rational expectations equilibrium for xt, zt, yt can be written as the system (13), (14) by assuming
qt = yt. To obtain the equilibrium law of motion in eq. (1) write:
Yt = Γ1Yt−1 + Γ2zt (29)
zt = Nzt−1 + εt
Yt =
⎡
⎣ xt
yt
⎤
⎦ ; Γ1 =
⎡
⎣ F
11 0
H 01 0
⎤
⎦ ; Γ2 =
⎡
⎣ F
12
H 02
⎤
⎦ ; N = [F 22]
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where the vector Y 0t = [xt , yt] has dimension 1 × n + r. Assume the vector zt has dimension m = n + r,
therefore the number n+ r of observable variables is equal to the number of shocks, and the matrix Γ2 is square
(see Ravenna, 2007, for details on the non-square case). Since:
zt = Γ−12 Yt − Γ−12 Γ1Yt−1 = N [Γ−12 Yt−1 − Γ−12 Γ1Yt−2] + εt
we obtain a VAR(2) representation for eq. (29):
Yt = (Γ1 + Γ2NΓ−12 )Yt−1 − (Γ2NΓ−12 Γ1)Yt−2 + Γ2εt
= Γ1Yt−1 + Γ2Yt−2 + ηt (30)
If N = [0] the VAR(2) in eq. (30) simplifies to the VAR(1) in eq. (1). Typically DSGE models have a larger
number of observable variables than unobservable shocks, that is m < n + r. In this case a non-singular VAR
representation for the observable variables can still be obtained by including only an m-dimensional subset of
the vector Yt. In general, for the DSGE equilibrium to have a finite-order VAR representation Yt must include
all the elements of the vector xt (see Ravenna, 2007).
In the case where part of the variance of Yt is explained by random shocks not included in the DSGE
model we have that Yt = Γ1Yt−1 + Γ2zt + Cwt where wt is a vector white noise. Then
Yt = (Γ1 + Γ2NΓ−12 )Yt−1 − (Γ2NΓ−12 Γ1)Yt−2 + Γ2εt − Γ2NΓ−12 Cwt−1 +Cwt
= Γ1Yt−1 + Γ2Yt−2 + ηt + ewt (31)
where ewt = [Cwt − Γ2NΓ−12 Cwt−1]. For N = [0] and C = I eq. (31) simplifies to eq. (2).
7.4 DSGE Model Solution Method under Private Sector Incorrect Believes
Assume a DSGE model is described by the system of stochastic diﬀerence equations:
0 = AEt(Yt+1) +BYt + CYt−1 +Dzt (32)
zt = Nzt−1 + εt (33)
Define the rational expectation equilibrium for Yt under the monetary policy rule La as:
Yt = Γa1Yt−1 + Γa2zt
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where zt = Nzt−1+ εt. If the private sector expects the central bank to behave according to the policy rule Lb,
expectations are consistent with the rational expectation equilibrium for Yt defined by:
Yt = Γb1Yt−1 + Γb2zt (34)
Let E˜Lt indicate the expectation of a variable under the belief that the central bank follows the policy rule L.
The structural model (32) for Yt can then be written as:
0 = AE˜bt (Yt+1) +BYt + CYt−1 +Dzt
= A[Γb1Yt + Γb2Nzt] +BYt +CYt−1 +Dzt (35)
The model (35) can be solved for Yt. For any policy La 6= Lb the solution for (35) will be diﬀerent from the
reduced-form law of motion (34). If the central bank’s policy La is specified in terms of expected inflation, the
DSGE model under incorrect private sector believes is given by:
0 = A[Γb1Yt + Γb2Nzt] +AcbEt(Yt+1) +BYt + CYt−1 +Dzt (36)
The expectation term appears because the central bank’s instrument reacts to the rational expectation inflation
forecast. Acb includes the coeﬃcients on the central bank’s expected values of Yt+1 in the policy rule. Solving
the model (36) for the rational expectations equilibrium yields the law of motion for Yt:
Yt = Γc1Yt−1 + Γc2zt
which assumes the central bank knows the private sector incorrect believes about the policy regime L, and takes
them into account when formulating its own inflation forecast.
7.5 Building Policy Shock Series to Achieve Historical Inflation Path
Let qit define the ith row of the vector qt and q
−i
t the vector including all the rows of qt except the i
th one, which
we assume is the row corresponding to the inflation variable. Eqs. (25), (26) imply that for any counterfactual
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path ξ10t and Kalman-filtered estimate ξ
2
t|T :
ξ1t = F
11ξ1t−1 + F
12ξ2t−1|T
qit = H
01iξ1t +H
02iξ2t|T = H
01iF 11ξ1t−1 +H
01iF 12ξ2t−1|T +H
02iξ2t|T
= H 01iF 11ξ1t−1 +H
01iF 12ξ2t−1|T +H
02i−jξ2
−j
t|T +H
02ijξ2
j
t|T (37)
where H 01i (H 02i) is the ith row of the matrix H 01 (H 02), H 02i
j
is the jth column of the matrix H 02i, H 02i
−j
is
a matrix including all the columns of H 02i except the jth, which we assume is the column corresponding to the
policy shock variable ξ2
j
t|T , and ξ
2−j
t|T is the vector composed of all the elements of ξ
2
t|T except the j
th one. By
setting the variable qit equal to its historical smoothed estimate qit|T eq. (37) can be solved recursively for the
shock bξ2jt = bεi,t :
bξ2jt = ³H 02ij´−1 hqit|TH 01i − F 11ξ1t−1 −H 01iF 12ξ2t−1|T −H 02i−jξ2−jt|T i
Since it is assumed that for the inflation equation wit = 0 ∀ t, it follows that qit|T = qo
i
t and bξ2jt is the value
of the policy shock ensuring that inflation equals its historical value in the counterfactual history where the
dynamics of the economy is described by the matrices F 11, F 12,H 0.
7.6 Market Clearing and Aggregate Equilibrium Conditions for the DSGE model
The household’s intratemporal optimality condition for consumption allocation is
CF,t
CH,t
= γ1−γ (St)
−ρ where
St = PF,t/PH,t. Euler equations for domestic and foreign riskless bonds can be combined to give:
0 = Et
½
MUCt+1
Pt
Pt+1
∙
et+1
et
(1 + i∗t )− (1 + it)
¸¾
(38)
MUCt = Et
∙
Dt
Ct − bCt−1
− βb Dt+1
Ct+1 − bCt
¸
where MUCt is the marginal utility of consumption, (1 + it) = v−1t is the gross nominal interest rate and
(1 + i∗t ) = v∗
−1
t is the interest rate paid by domestic residents to borrow on the international capital market.
Market clearing in the domestic economy requires
YH,t =
Z 1
0
AtNt(i)di = AtNt =
Z 1
0
∙
PH,t(i)
PH,t
¸−ϑ
(CH,t + C∗H,t)di
or YH,t = (CH,t +C∗H,t)st where st =
R 1
0
h
PH,t(i)
PH,t
i−ϑ
di. Since all firms face identical marginal costs, any firm
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belonging to the fraction (1− θp) resetting the price at t chooses the same new optimal price: P˜H,t(i) = P˜H,t
and PRTH,t (i) = P
RT
H,t . The solution to the optimal pricing problem is given by:
P˜H,t(i)Et
∞X
s=0
(θpβ)sΛt,t+s
"
P˜H,t(i)
PH,t+s
#1−ϑ
CWt+s =
ϑ
ϑ− 1Et
∞X
s=0
(θpβ)sΛt,t+sMCNt+s
"
P˜H,t(i)
PH,t+s
#1−ϑ
CWt+s.
(39)
The CPI index evolves according to:
PH,t =
h
θpP 1−ϑH,t−1 + (1− θp)P
1−ϑ
H,t
i 1
1−ϑ
PH,t =
h
ωpPRT
1−ϑ
H,t + (1− ωp) eP 1−ϑH,t i 11−ϑ
Each household purchases an equal amount CjH,t(i) so that C
j
H,t(i) = CH,t(i). Since the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor will be equal across all households who can reset the wage at a
given time, the wage setting equation (40) implies that all household contracting a new wage at t will choose the
same new optimal wage, so that W˜ jt = W˜t. Let MUN
j
t+s =
∂Ujt+s
∂Njt+s
. The first order condition for household j
is:
Et
( ∞X
s=0
(θswβ
s)
"
φ− 1
φ
MUCjt+s
W˜ jt
Pt+s
#
N jt+s
)
= −Et
( ∞X
s=0
(θswβ
s)
h
MUN jt+s
i
N jt+s
)
(40)
Using the wage index definition and WRT
j
t =WRTt , the aggregate wage index evolves according to:
Wt =
h
θwWt−11−φ + (1− θw)(1− ωw)W˜ 1−φt + (1− θw)ωwWRT
1−φ
t
i 1
1−φ
Aggregating over firms in the importing sector results in the aggregate foreign-good price index PF,t equal toh
θFP 1−ϑF,t−1 + (1− θp) eP 1−ϑF,t i 11−ϑ where ePF,t is the price chosen by re-optimizing firms. The law of motion for
the net foreign asset stock B∗t can be derived using the households’ budget constraints and the market clearing
conditions. To ensure stationarity we assume that i∗is given by the exogenous world interest rate ei∗ plus a
premium increasing in the real value of the country’s stock of foreign debt: (1 + i∗t ) = (1 + ı˜∗t )g(− eBt), whereeBt = etB∗tPH,t and g(·) is a positive, increasing function.
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Table 1: Estimates of the Monetary Policy Rule
ωπ ωy χ α
1971 : 1− 1990 : 4
1.09
(0.51)
1.21
(0.30)
0.91
(0.02)
−0.08
(0.90)
1992 : 1− 2005 : 1
2.16
(0.72)
0.27
(0.09)
0.84
(0.03)
−0.02
(0.34)
Note: Estimate of policy rule it = (1−χ)[ωπEtπt+1+ωyyt] +χit−1+ εi,t on Canadian quarterly
data using GMM estimator with heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance ma-
trix. α is a constant. Standard errors reported in brackets. The instrument set includes four lags of
the interest rate, inflation rate, money supply growth rate and three lags of the HP-filtered output.
See the Appendix for data sources.
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                                   T ab le  2:  M ax im um  L ik el iho od  E st im ates        
P ar am e te r     E st im ate   S ta nd ard  D e viat ion  
In v er se la bo r su pp ly  e last ic i ty  η   2 .6 5   1 .8 2   
P r ic e e la st ic i ty  o f  d em and  -  f o re ig n  b ask e t ρ   2 .2 3   0 .8 7   
S hare  o f ru le-o f- th um b  dom es tic  f irm s ω p   0 .8 9   0 .0 6   
S hare  o f ru le-o f- th um b  hou s eho ld s ω w   0 .3 2   0 .1 2   
P r ob ab il i ty o f n o t res e tt in g  p rice  -  d om es tic  f irm s θp   0 .9 4   0 .0 4   
P r ob ab il i ty o f n o t res e tt in g  w ag e  θw   0 .7 9   0 .0 9   
P r ob ab il i ty o f n o t res e tt in g  p rice  -  im po rt s ec to r θ F   0 .7 3   0 .0 7   
H ab it p er sisten c e co e ff ic ien t b   0 .9 4   0 .0 3   
A R (1 ) p a ram eter - tech no lo g y  s h o ck  ρ a   0 .9 3   0 .0 7   
A R (1 ) p a ram eter - p ref eren c e sh o ck  ρ d   0 .8 2   0 .1 1   
A R (1 ) p a ram eter - fo re ig n  d em and  sh o ck  ρ c *   0 .7 3   0 .0 6   
A R (1 ) p a ram eter - fo re ig n  g ood  in f la t io n  sh o ck  ρ π ∗  0 .9 6   0 .0 2   
A R (1 ) p a ram eter - fo re ig n  in teres t ra te  sh o ck  ρ i *  0 .9 7    0 .0 1    
  C ovar iance  M a tr ix   Q         
T ec hno lo gy  sh o c k  in no v atio n  σ a   0 .4 7   0 .0 9   
P r eferen c e sh o c k  in no v atio n  σ d   5 .6 8   3 .2 7   
M o neta ry  p o licy  s h o ck  in nov atio n  σ i  0 .1 5   0 .0 1   
F o reig n  d em a nd  sh o c k  in n ov atio n  σ c *  1 .4 7   0 .2 4   
F o reig n  g ood  in f la t io n  s h o ck  in nov atio n  σ π ∗   0 .1 4   0 .0 4   
F o reig n  in ter est r a te  sh o c k  in nov atio n  σ i*   0 .1 1   0 .0 1   
C or rela t ion  - fo re ign  sh o c ks  inn ova t ion s co rr( c*, i*)  0 .5 6   0 .1 1   
 co rr(c *,π *)  -0 .3 1  0 .2 1   
  co rr(π *,i* )  0 .4 6    0 .1 9    
   C ovar ian ce  M at rix  R          
O u tpu t σ Y h   1 .1 4   0 .1 6   
C P I  in f la tio n  σ π  0 .3 8   0 .0 3   
T er m s o f  trad e  σ s   2 .7 3   0 .3 1   
E xch a ng e ra te  d ep re c ia tio n  σ Δ e   2 .3 2   0 .2 6   
F o reig n  con sum p tio n  o f  d om estic  g ood  σ c h *  0 .8 9   0 .2 8   
W a ge in f la t io n  σ ξ   0 .4 5   0 .0 4   
L abo r  h ou rs  σ n   0 .8 1   0 .2 2   
R eal m arg in al co s t  σ m c   1 .0 2    0 .1 6    
Note: Maximum likelihood estimates for DSGE model in eqs. (13), (14) and (23). The vector
[σat , σdt , σεi,t , σC∗t , σπ∗F,t , σ ı˜∗t ] contains the square root of the main diagonal entries of covari-
ance matrixQ for structural shocks innovations. The vector [σYH,t , σπt , σSt , σ∆et , σC∗H,t , σξt , σNt ,
σMCt ] contains the square root of the non-zero main diagonal entries of covariance matrix R for
wt = [wYH,t , wπt , wit , wSt , wet/et−1 , wC∗H,t , wı˜∗t , wξt , wNt , wMCt ]. Data set includes the
variables [YH,t, πt, it, St, et/et−1, C∗H,t, ı˜
∗
t , ξt, Nt, MCt]. Sample: 1991:1 - 2007:2
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                                   Table 3: Likelihood Ratio Tests       
      
Model Log likelihood  Likelihood   P value 
 value  ratio   
          
      
Benchmark model 757 -  - 
Unrestricted model 649 216 (202)  0.23 
Restricted covariance matrix  R:      
[σYh = 0, σp = 0, σch* = 0, σmc = 0] 797 80 (4)  0.00 
Flexible domestic producer prices and wages     
[θp = 0, θw = 0, ωp = 0, ωw = 0] 771 28 (4)  0.00 
Flexible import prices     
[θF = 0] 777 40 (1)  0.00 
          
 
Note: Likelihood ratio tests with respect to benchmark model. Negative of log-likelihood value
reported. Unrestricted model is the model in eqs. (13), (14) and (23) estimated without any
restriction on the matrices F, H, Q, R. Restricted covariance matrix model assumes the only non-
zero variance components of wt are [wSt , wet/et−1 , wξt , wNt ]. Degrees of freedom for likelihood
ratio statistic reported in brackets.
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Table 4: Inflation statistics
Historical Counterfactual Ratio Diﬀerence
policy policy counterfactualhistorical (πcount − πhist)
Standard deviation
given ML estimate of covariance matrix Q 0.98 1.59 1.62
Conditional on sample shocks 0.72 0.73 1.01
No rule-of-thumb firms [ωp = 0]
Conditional standard deviation 0.75 0.80 1.08
Higher labor supply elasticity [η = 1]
Conditional standard deviation 0.66 1.77 2.69
Inflation realizations
1991:1 - 2007:2 1.40 0.43
2003:2 - 2007:2 2.01 0.82
Note: Statistics for smoothed estimate of annual CPI inflation under historical and counterfactual
policy rule. Counterfactual policy rule is estimated over the 1971:1 - 1990:4 sample (Table 1).
Standard deviation conditional on sample shocks is computed from the realized inflation path given
the sample estimate of the Kalman-smoothed shocks vector ξ2t|T and the theoretical expectation
of inflation. Benchmark model estimates: ωp = 0.89, η = 2.66. Inflation realization statistics
report sample average ratio and diﬀerence between counterfactual and historical smoothed inflation
estimate. Standard deviations reported in percentage points.
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Table 5: Probability of inflation realizations conditional
on inflation targeting policy in the period 1991-2007
n
3 6 9 12 15
Probability of n or more realizations 0.83 0.70 0.58 0.47 0.38
larger than 0.84 s.d. above the mean
Probability of 9 or more consecutive realizations 0.35
larger than 0.84 s.d. above the mean
Note: Probability calculated over 25,000 simulations of 66 quarters sample with the model ergodic
distribution conditional on the policy rule coeﬃcients estimated over the inflation targeting sample
(Table 1).
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Table 6: Inflation forecast error variance decomposition
Corr(π, y)
Inflation forecast error variance
due to ı˜∗t , P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, εit
estimated small sample
Shock
Technology −0.99
Preference −0.55
Foreign demand −0.96
Foreign good inflation 0.04
Foreign interest rate −0.07
Monetary policy 0.14
Variance decomposition
shocks ordering
ı˜∗t , P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, C
∗
t , At,Dt, εit 78% 99%
ı˜∗t , C∗t , P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, At,Dt, εit 79% 91%
P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, ı˜
∗
t , C∗t , At,Dt, εit 77% 98%
C∗t , ı˜∗t , P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, At,Dt, εit 79% 60%
P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, C
∗
t , ı˜∗t , At,Dt, εit 78% 98%
C∗t , P ∗F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, ı˜
∗
t , At,Dt, εit 78% 61%
Note: First column shows correlation between output and CPI inflation for the estimated model
in the case all business cycle volatility were generated by a single shock. Inflation asymptotic
forecast error variance decomposition is computed from the exogenous shocks innovations’ covariance
matrix maximum likelihood estimate (estimated column) and conditional on the smoothed shocks’
innovations covariance matrix
bbQ = 1TΣTt=1bvtbv0t over 1991:1 - 2007:2 (small sample column). All
results assume the monetary authority enforces the historical policy rule.
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Figure 1: Kalman-smoothed structural shocks vector ξ2t , 1991:1 - 2007:2 sample. Law of motion
obtained from DSGE model conditional on policy rule coeﬃcients estimated over the inflation targeting
sample (Table 1). Light lines plot Root Mean Square Error bands. Scaling in percent.
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Figure 2: Historical data and Kalman-smoothed estimate. Law of motion obtained from DSGE model
conditional on policy rule coeﬃcients estimated over the inflation targeting sample (Table 1). Output
is defined as YH,t = CH,t + C∗H,t. Light lines plot Root Mean Square Error bands. Scaling in percent.
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Figure 3: The impact of inflation targeting. Historical series vs. counterfactual under pre-inflation
targeting policy. Law of motion for counterfactual path obtained from DSGE model conditional on
policy rule coeﬃcients estimated over the sample 1971:1 - 1990:4 (Table 1). The historical inflation
measure is the Consumer Price Index net of indirect taxes. Inflation and output historical series are
the Kalman-smoothed estimate of the data. Conditional on the inflation targeting policy, realizations
of inflation larger than 0.84 standard deviations above the mean are observed with probability < 20%.
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Figure 4: The impact of policy shocks. Historical series vs. counterfactual under inflation targeting
policy conditional on policy shock εi,t = 0 in every period. All other components of the shocks vector
are set equal to the Kalman-smoothed estimate. Law of motion for counterfactual path obtained from
DSGE model conditional on policy rule coeﬃcients estimated over the inflation targeting sample (Table
1). Historical inflation measure is the Consumer Price Index net of indirect taxes. Inflation, output,
and interest rate historical series are the Kalman-smoothed estimates of the data.
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Figure 5: The impact of credibility. Historical series vs. counterfactual under inflation targeting
policy when policy change to inflation targeting is not believed by the private sector. Law of motion for
counterfactual path obtained from DSGE model conditional on policy rule coeﬃcients estimated over
the inflation targeting sample. Private sector expectations are consistent with policy rule coeﬃcients
estimated over the sample 1971:1 - 1990:4. Bottom panel plots additional counterfactual output when
policy shock εi,t is set so that counterfactual inflation follows historical path.
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Figure 6: Comparing methodologies to build counterfactuals. Historical series vs. counter-
factual under pre-inflation targeting policy. Accounting method series is the counterfactual obtained
assuming the only non-zero variance components of wt are [wSt , wet/et−1 , wξt , wNt ]. No expectation
channel series assumes law of motion is obtained from DSGE model conditional on policy rule coeﬃ-
cients estimated over the sample 1971:1 - 1990:4, while private sector expectations are consistent with
policy rule coeﬃcients estimated over the inflation targeting sample.
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